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Kristine L. Bowman*
Universities’ Speech and the First
Amendment
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, scholars and students alike suggest that university
leaders should engage in speech to oppose racism and other systemic
discrimination. In May and June of 2020, countless university leaders
across the country did exactly that, expressing solidarity with the Black
Lives Matter movement. That speech also contained implied answers to
two questions: normatively, should a public university speak in this
way, and legally, can it do so? Developing a robust answer to the sec-
ond question is the focus of this Article, which brings together political
scientist Corey Brettschneider’s conceptualization of government
speech as persuasive or coercive; federal constitutional law (forum
analysis doctrine and government speech doctrine); and recent changes
in state law regarding free speech at public colleges and universities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We often think of universities as physical places where speech hap-
pens, rather than institutions who are speakers in their own right.
However, universities are both of these things, and the intersection
can be messy. Campus speech controversies between 2016 and 2020
brought one aspect of this intersection into focus as universities re-
acted to visiting campus speakers like Richard Spencer and Milo Yian-
nopoulos, whose speech perpetuates systemic discrimination. In 2020,
another aspect came into focus when the Black Lives Matter move-
ment gained momentum after the killings of George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery, and countless university leaders across
the country issued statements expressing solidarity with the move-
ment. Throughout this time, an increasing number of scholars and ad-
vocates have been calling for universities, as powerful, elite
institutions, to speak up for the minoritized and marginalized.1 These
statements, especially when followed by action, could be considered
acts of “moral leadership.”2
The responses of university leaders in both of these situations—
responses to events that occur on their campus and in the world—are
important and are gaining increasing attention in literature. For ex-
ample, recently, Katharine Gelber and I analyzed how and why a uni-
versity’s silence in the face of systemically discriminatory speech on
its campus by outside speakers (such as Spencer and Yiannopoulos)
accommodates discrimination, thereby enabling the harm it consti-
tutes and seeks to cause.3 We contended that universities have a nor-
mative obligation to refute systemic discrimination because if they do
not, their silence allows the harm to occur and perpetuates injustice.4
We further demonstrated why universities’ “silence” includes both
failure to acknowledge and respond to the harm—the colloquial un-
1. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students,
101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1802 (2017).
2. HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 94 (2019).
3. Katharine Gelber & Kristine L. Bowman, Responding to Hate Speech: Counter
Speech and the University (forthcoming).
4. Id.
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derstanding of the term—as well as an equivocal, or limited, acknowl-
edgement or response to the harm.5 We concluded that universities
can engage in effective counter-speech and partially mitigate the
harms of systemically discriminatory speech by challenging the im-
plied authority of the speaker and countering the harmful speech’s in-
egalitarian norms. Doing so, we argue, prevents the speech from
disempowering its targets, and therefore, such counter-speech by uni-
versity leaders is ultimately speech-enhancing.6
Our work dovetails both with the work of critical theorists who
note that “the burdens of hateful speech are not evenly distributed”7
and with research about the significance of bystander intervention—
the idea that when those who are not direct targets of speech or action
speak up, they can powerfully support the target and interrupt the
harm the speech or action constitutes and seeks to cause. It also is
consistent with the views of other leading First Amendment scholars
such as Catherine Ross, who writes that “the harm assaultive speech
[on campus] causes affects the whole community, not just the intended
targets. The victims should not be expected to shoulder the additional
burden of responding to speech that denigrates them.”8 Although the
Dean of Berkeley Law, Erwin Chemerinsky, and University of Califor-
nia-Irvine Chancellor, Howard Gillman, think universities’ role as
speakers should be limited, lest leaders “[create] a campus orthodoxy
of opinion,” they also write: “Still, there are times when views so as-
sault the campus’s basic values that leaders need to speak up.”9 For
both Chemerinsky10 and Gillman,11 the killing of George Floyd and
others along with the protests in mid-2020 marked one of those times.
Given the practical importance of universities refuting systemi-
cally discriminatory speech occurring on their campuses and in the
world, it is important to examine how the law aligns with the claim
that universities and their leaders should speak in this way. Yet, the
literature lacks a thorough analysis of the legal contours of such ac-
tion. This Article fills that gap, focusing on the colleges and universi-
ties that are state actors: public institutions. In this Article, I first
explore the nuanced nature of government speech, relying on political
5. Id.
6. Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1987, 1993 (2017).
7. Id. at 2037.
8. Catherine J. Ross, Assaultive Words and Constitutional Norms, 66 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 739, 768 (2017).
9. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 149–50
(2017).
10. See Letter from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, UC Berkeley Sch. of Law, to Berkeley
Law Sch. Cmty. (Oct. 8, 2020) (on file with author).
11. See Letter from Howard Gillman, Chancellor, Univ. of Cal. Irvine, to Univ. of Cal.
Irvine Cmty. (May 31, 2020) (on file with author).
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scientist Corey Brettschneider’s theory of value democracy and his im-
portant insight that speech by the government can be persuasive or
coercive. Then, I analyze and synthesize Supreme Court doctrine rele-
vant to public space as a venue (public forum doctrine) and the gov-
ernment’s restriction of individual speech that contradicts its own
(government speech doctrine); I also consider the problem of a “chil-
ling effect.” I discuss occasions—in our lived experiences and in the
black-letter law—in which government is simultaneously the neutral
arbiter of a venue and a persuasive speaker in that same venue, ad-
vancing its own viewpoint. Although this is consistent with the cur-
rent doctrine, jurisprudence and literature take the approach of
noting that persuasive government speech is not excluded from public
fora—and stop there. Rather than adopting the common refrain of “it’s
not prohibited,” I conceptualize affirmatively how and why such
speech belongs in the public forum. I thus add nuance to our under-
standing of First Amendment doctrine by viewing the relationship be-
tween the public forum and government speech doctrines from
another angle, illuminating what was previously hidden from view.
Because it is both important and timely to understand how the law
does (or does not) constrain what public universities may say in re-
sponse to systemically discriminatory speech occurring on their cam-
puses or in the world, I apply this concept to public universities, with
particular attention to a wave of state legislation enacted from 2016
through mid-2020 which has sought to shape the landscape of free
speech on campuses. Specifically, at least a dozen states, reacting to a
purported free speech “crisis” on college and university campuses,12
have enacted legislation that declares all public spaces on campuses to
be public fora. Additionally, four state legislatures have regulated
what a public university may say as a speaker, directly contradicting
the core idea of government speech. By considering these two emerg-
ing themes in state law, including their intersection with federal con-
stitutional principles and the theory of value democracy, I add
significant analytical depth to the assertion that universities can use
counter-speech, such as anti-racist solidarity statements, to respond
to harmful speech.
Before proceeding, I note that the topic of free speech on campus is
so vast that it is important to clarify what this Article addresses and
what it does not. First, my focus is on speech by “the university,” as
exemplified through speech by senior leaders of public universities
such as presidents, provosts, vice presidents, vice provosts, and deans.
This speech would almost certainly be considered government speech
12. Mary Anne Franks, The Miseducation of Free Speech, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
218, 221–32 (2019) (providing an extensive discussion of the actual events and
the media campaign that sought to create the perception of a free speech “crisis”
on campuses).
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under any of its various permutations if individuals were to claim they
had the ability to share a contrary message in the same space.13 Sec-
ond, this Article examines government speech that seeks to advance
equality, not speech that seeks to advance inequality. The latter ques-
tion is too complex to address here; however, for more thinking on this
topic, I refer curious readers to the excellent work of leading govern-
ment speech scholar Helen Norton.14 Finally, this Article is not about
whether, or in what situations, universities can or should punish stu-
dents or faculty for their speech.15
II. GOVERNMENT SPEECH: PERSUASIVE, COERCIVE, OR
BOTH?
When considering free speech, we think perhaps most often of gov-
ernment as the regulator, not as the speaker. Yet, government is both
of these things. Often, we do not take time to analyze, and thus disen-
tangle, which role government is occupying in a given moment or to
think about when government should occupy one role rather than the
other. However, doing so can add nuance and depth to our under-
standing of government as speaker. In this Part, I engage
Brettschneider’s contention that when government speaks, it can
speak in a coercive manner or a persuasive one,16 summarizing his
work and the literature that builds upon it.
In 2012, Brettschneider published When the State Speaks, What
Should It Say?, in which he articulated a new liberal political theory:
value democracy. In his words, this theory aims to “defend robust
rights of free speech, religion, and association” and “articulate the rea-
13. I do not consider the situations in which students arguably become government
actors with government speech rights, as I think those claims stretch the govern-
ment speech doctrine beyond recognition. For a discussion of the changing tests
over time, including in the Court’s 2015 Walker decision, see Mary-Rose Papan-
drea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195 (2016) (analyzing Walker
v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015)).
14. NORTON, supra note 2, at 93–126.
15. The speech rights of students and faculty on campuses of public universities are
broad (presumably under Garcetti, the rights of staff are less so), and various
excellent articles explore these issues. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 1, at
1805–11 (exploring the legal possibility of punishing students for their speech
and discussing examples).
16. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? (2012).
In this Article, I focus on Brettschneider’s book, as it is the location where his
argument is spelled out in greatest detail. Readers may also be interested in an
article that appears to be an earlier version of parts of this argument as well as
an essay published in a law review that draws on the book and the earlier essay.
See Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? The Di-
lemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion, 8 PERSP. ON POL.
1005 (2010); Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint
Neutrality: A Theory of Free Speech and Its Implications for the State Speech and
Limited Public Forum Doctrines, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 603 (2013).
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sons that justify why rights should be respected in the first place, [in-
cluding attempting] to convince citizens to adopt the democratic
values of freedom and equality as their own.”17 A key premise in
Brettschneider’s argument involves distinguishing “between a state’s
coercive power, or its ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and
its expressive power, or its ability to influence beliefs and behavior by
‘speaking’ to hate groups and the larger society.”18 Specifically,
Brettschneider contends that “the state should simultaneously protect
hateful viewpoints in its coercive capacity and criticize them in its ex-
pressive capacity.”19
Brettschneider frames his approach as an alternative to the “two
positions [that] have defined the debate over state responses to hate
speech”: “neutralism” and “prohibitionism.”20 The prevailing view in
the United States is the assumption that government should be neu-
tral among all viewpoints, including hateful ones that arguably under-
mine and threaten freedom and equality; this is neutralism, also
known as agnosticism.21 Many, if not most, other liberal democracies
around the world are more amenable to prohibiting hateful speech
and discriminatory viewpoints. Australia, Canada, and Germany are
among the most prominent countries to adopt this approach, known as
prohibitionism.22 Neutralism is anathema to prohibitionists, and vice
versa.23 The debate is a deep one in law, politics, and philosophy.24
Perhaps unsurprisingly, responses to value democracy tend to pull ei-
ther in the direction of neutralism or towards prohibitionism, such as
four of the six contributions in a 2014 Brooklyn Law Review sympo-
sium focused on Brettschneider’s work.25
17. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 4.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 72.
21. Id. at 1–3; Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free
Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2005).
22. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 1–3.
23. Id. at 8–9.
24. For example, in the chapter focused most squarely on free expression and demo-
cratic persuasion, Brettschneider discusses work by John Rawls, Ronald Dwor-
kin, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Jeremy Waldron. Id. at 75–82.
25. Brettschneider characterizes the contributions by Steven Calabresi and Andrew
Koppelman as pulling towards neutralism, those by Robin West and Sarah Song
as pushing towards prohibitionism, and those by Josiah Ober and Frank
Michelman as extending his argument. See Corey Brettschneider, Democratic
Persuasion and Freedom of Speech: A Response to Four Critics and Two Allies, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1059 (2014). The core of Calabresi’s contention is that he would
extend Brettschneider’s argument so that government would also speak against
religious discrimination in addition to discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
and gender. Steven G. Calabresi, Freedom of Expression and the Golden Mean, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1005, 1013 (2014). Koppelman’s piece is by far the most overtly
critical of Brettschneider’s, alleging, in a nutshell, that Brettschneider proposes a
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By distinguishing between the government’s role as coercive rule-
maker and its role as persuasive influencer, Brettschneider seeks to
create a third way, in which government simultaneously allows the
expression of all viewpoints and also wields its influence in an equita-
ble manner to support freedom and equality. In the words of legal
scholar Robin West:
Brettschneider shows us how to think of the state as a fully moral actor in this
ongoing liberal project, leaving behind the two roles our traditional debates on
this issue have articulated for it: roles as the generator of unconstitutional
laws that inhibit speech, or the sometimes overly zealous protector of individ-
ual rights to engage in it. The state is more complex than this simplistic di-
chotomy and can multi-task with the best of us.26
The concepts of coercion and persuasion are both key to
Brettschneider’s argument. His narrow, law-based view of coercion al-
lows him to draw a bright line between state speech that is “coer-
cive”—requires a certain behavior—and speech that is “persuasive”—
intended to encourage individuals and groups to behave in a particu-
lar way. More specifically, Brettschneider relies on philosopher Robert
Nozick’s definition of coercion, which Brettschneider describes as “the
state threatening to impose a sanction or punishment on an individual
one-size-fits-all approach that lacks nuance, presents “silly” responses to counter-
arguments, and does not provide evidence to support that the problems he identi-
fies are actually problems. Andrew Koppelman, You’re All Individuals:
Brettschneider on Free Speech, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2014). West’s piece
builds on a book review she wrote the year earlier, Robin West, Liberal Responsi-
bilities, 49 TULSA L. REV. 393 (2013) [hereinafter West, Liberal Responsibilities].
Robin West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibilities: Review of Corey
Brettschneider’s When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1031 (2014) [hereinafter West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibilities].
Both pieces express sympathy with Brettschneider’s project yet criticize
Brettschneider’s book as limited because it is out of step with current constitu-
tional theory. Still, her works commend Brettschneider’s book to readers given its
substantial contribution to debates about hate speech: focusing on the govern-
ment’s role in responding, not merely individuals’ rights to engage. West, Liberal
Responsibilities, supra, at 402–03. Song identifies and elaborates on the primary
objections of neutralists—that “‘[p]ersuasion’ [i]s [c]oercion”—and prohibition-
ists—that “[p]ersuasion [d]oesn’t [g]o [f]ar [e]nough” because it restricts itself to
issues of public concern and not so-called private matters. Sarah Song, The Lib-
eral Tightrope: Brettschneider on Free Speech, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1047, 1049,
1053 (2014). Ober focuses on rhetoric as formally understood and contends that if
the state is to persuade, it must attend to the effect of its speech, and thus the
rhetorical form, and not rely merely on an intent to convince. Josiah Ober, Demo-
cratic Rhetoric: How Should the State Speak?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1015–16
(2014). Michelman contends that Brettschneider does not adequately develop the
notion of the legitimacy of the state and attempts to fill this gap. Frank I.
Michelman, Legitimacy and Autonomy: Values of the Speaking State, 79 BROOK.
L. REV. 985, 985 (2014). Brettschneider’s work, of course, has also received atten-
tion in political science. See, e.g., Katharine Gelber, When the State Speaks,
What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote
Equality, 124 ETHICS 177 (2013) (book review).
26. West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibilities, supra note 25, at 1033.
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or group of individuals with the aim of prohibiting a particular action,
expression, or holding of a belief.”27 Political theorists Paul Billing-
ham and Sarah Song, as well as legal scholar Robin West—scholars
from a range of perspectives and disciplines—independently challenge
this characterization, contending instead that Nozick understands co-
ercion more broadly as focusing on an actor’s intent to persuade others
to adopt a certain course of action, which can occur at times through a
symbolic sanction.28 However, whether or not Brettschneider accu-
rately captures Nozick’s understanding, Brettschneider advances a
clear definition of coercion himself, and it is one with a bright line that
helps to establish clarity and predictability.
That said, Brettschneider focuses more of his argument on persua-
sive state speech, which may be because neutralism is so often an un-
stated assumption in the American context. In laying the groundwork
for his normative argument, he first highlights ways in which the gov-
ernment already speaks persuasively in support of freedom and equal-
ity, namely by “celebrating official holidays that honor democratic
ideals, . . . funding efforts to advance freedom and equality for all citi-
zens,” and “building public monuments to civil rights leaders like Mar-
tin Luther King, [Jr.].”29 Norton30 and West separately have echoed
this assessment that persuasive state speech is ubiquitous, with West
observing:
The state does, after all, already “speak” and attempt to persuade constantly;
it is never quiet. The state speaks when it passes laws; when it justifies them
in judicial decisions; when it promulgates administrative regulations and ad-
judicates those regulations; when it imposes sanctions in civil cases; when it
educates children in public schools; and when it imprisons, fines, and executes
people. Almost all of that speech, furthermore, is “persuasive.” Persuasive
state speech is as present as air.31
Neutralism so dominates American conceptions about the role of the
state, and the correlative First Amendment culture, that this state-
ment may cause some American readers to cringe. However, while
West’s assessment of the current presence of persuasive government
speech may be hard for some readers to swallow, it is on point.
Through persuasive speech, Brettschneider contends, government
already resists the “paradox of rights,” in which “liberalism justifies
rights protections based on an ideal of equality, but the liberal state
cannot respond to critics of equality who are protected by rights.”32
27. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 88.
28. Paul Billingham, State Speech as a Response to Hate Speech: Assessing “Trans-
formative Liberalism,” 22 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 639, 643–45 (2019);
Song, supra note 25, at 1053–55; West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibili-
ties, supra note 25, at 1039–43.
29. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 7.
30. See generally NORTON, supra note 2.
31. West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibilities, supra note 25, at 1034.
32. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 7.
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Furthermore, he argues that under value democracy, it is proper for
the state to advocate for equality; unless the state speaks in opposi-
tion to hateful speech, (1) it will actually be complicit in the speech or
be perceived as complicit, and (2) free and equal citizenship will be
undermined.33 Billingham questions both of these justifications in the
most thorough response to Brettschneider’s work in social science
literature to date.34 To be sure, these are empirical claims, and
Brettschneider’s argument would be stronger with more evidence—as
would Billingham’s rejection of Brettschneider’s claims.
Ultimately, Brettschneider argues that through democratic per-
suasion, the state should “express the reasons and values that under-
lie rights” and “attempt to change the minds of both the members of
hate groups and citizens more generally.”35 Such persuasion can in-
volve the state articulating a viewpoint, and, more controversially, it
can also involve the state refusing to subsidize views it characterizes
as undermining free and equal citizenship.36 As suggested above,
some reject the idea that Brettschneider has proposed a third way,
and instead, see his approach as another variation on the heavy-
handed “invasive state.” Billingham contends that the concept of “free
and equal citizenship” is vague and that Brettschneider applies it in-
consistently.37 Legal scholars Steven Calabresi, Bryan Fair, Richard
Garnett, Michael McConnell, and Kevin Vallier all contest the appli-
cation of Brettschneider’s argument to religious organizations and in-
dividuals.38 At the same time, others, such as Song and West, contend
that Brettschneider does not go far enough, asking why he is focused
exclusively on race and sex equality (and perhaps more on race than
sex).39
It is fitting that Brettschneider tests the application of his ideas in
educational settings given the substantial presence of persuasive state
speech, particularly in the K-12 context. He notes that K-12 school
curriculum—especially civil rights curriculum—is not neutral, which
33. Id. at 16–17, 44–45, 85; Billingham, supra note 28, at 641–43.
34. Billingham, supra note 28, at 641–43.
35. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 91.
36. Id. at 109–41.
37. Billingham, supra note 28, at 646–47.
38. Calabresi, supra note 25, at 1013–14; Bryan K. Fair, Freedom of Speech, Equal
Citizenship, and the Anticaste Principle: A Commentary on Regulating Hate
Speech, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 115,
119 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the
Nondiscrimination Norm, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra, at 194, 220–21; Michael W. McConnell, The New Estab-
lishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 466–75 (2000); Kevin Vallier, Relig-
ious Freedom and the Reasons for Rights, 6 PHIL. & PUB. ISSUES 9, 14–15 (2016);
see Billingham, supra note 28, at 646–48; Song, supra note 25, at 1051–53.
39. Song, supra note 25, at 1051; West, Liberty, Equality, and State Responsibilities,
supra note 25, at 1043–44.
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he contends is appropriate.40 To education law scholars, the idea that
the state advances a viewpoint through curriculum is hardly shocking.
Though again, because neutralism is such a foundational feature of
American constitutional law, Brettschneider’s accurate description
may come as a bit of a surprise to those who have not had reason to
think deeply about the role of the state in public elementary and sec-
ondary education.
Brettschneider’s discussion of higher education is more detailed
than his discussion of K-12 schools, and it focuses on an issue various
Supreme Court cases have brought to the forefront: whether recog-
nized student organizations should be funded by public universities in
a viewpoint-neutral way.41 Brettschneider distinguishes between col-
lege students’ free speech and association rights, which he would leave
unchanged, and what he describes as a right to receive a public sub-
sidy, where he would part ways with the viewpoint neutrality re-
quired by the Supreme Court and let universities distribute funds to
recognized student organizations in a way that would support free and
equal citizenship.42 Specifically, Brettschneider views these as in-
stances of a university “exercising state speech through the use of
[their] funds and . . . recognition of official student groups.”43 This
analysis lays the groundwork for a broader, controversial claim that
the state should use the power of the purse—whether by funding rec-
ognized student organizations or granting tax exemptions or other
subsidies to businesses—to support only organizations that support
free and equal citizenship.44
While on one hand it makes perfect sense that the principles
Brettschneider applies to the government at large are the same as
those he applies to a public university, there is also something to be
said for considering the role of a public university as a distinctive gov-
ernment institution, although Brettschneider’s work does not go that
far. Calabresi speculates on this topic, noting: “I would add that public
colleges, universities, and secondary schools could not even function if
they did not choose to praise some viewpoints and criticize others. The
praising of some things and the disapproving of others is basically at
the core of what education itself is all about.”45 Calabresi does not
elaborate, but at a general level his statement dovetails with West’s
earlier comment and with the idea articulated above that curricu-
lum—government speech by and in public institutions—is never neu-
40. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 95–96.
41. Id. at 115–20.
42. Id. at 114–22.
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 128–67.
45. Calabresi, supra note 25, at 1010. Though he does not say it, I suspect Calabresi
would agree that academic freedom is also relevant and important.
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tral. This is consistent with Brettschneider’s rejection of the idea that
the state can and should be neutral, which is a pervasive assumption
in First Amendment jurisprudence and much of the related
scholarship.46
In sum, Brettschneider’s work attempts to chart a course for the
state that responds to both the concerns of neutralism and prohibi-
tionism. Necessary to his argument is a nuanced understanding of the
role the state occupies when it speaks and, specifically, whether the
state is acting in its coercive capacity or its persuasive capacity. The
next Part will overlay Brettschneider’s conceptualization of govern-
ment speech onto First Amendment jurisprudence in which the state
is, or could be, a speaker.
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S DOCTRINAL PUZZLE
Now we turn to the doctrinal terrain, beginning by sketching out
the different pieces—forum analysis, government speech, and chilling
effect—and discussing the assumptions each contains about the state
as speaker. Then, I fit the pieces of the doctrine together, while also
incorporating Brettschneider’s understanding of government speech
into a discussion of the doctrine. In doing so, I theorize a conceptual
space in the doctrine, specifically in public forum doctrine, where gov-
ernment’s persuasive speech is already present in a practical way. As
others have noted, government’s persuasive speech may presently ex-
ist there—it is not disallowed. In contrast to an approach that relies
on the fact that such speech has not been ruled out, I offer a reason for
affirmatively ruling it in. This Part makes that argument and thus
lays the groundwork for the following Part, which will explore the ap-
plication of the doctrine to the speech of public universities.
A. The Doctrine’s Dominant Narratives
Forum analysis and government speech are the two core areas of
doctrine relevant to the speech of the state. In addition to understand-
ing each of these areas, it is important to consider how these areas fit
with one another and also with the prohibition on a chilling effect.
This section will address these issues in turn.
1. Government as Neutral Arbiter
Forum analysis doctrine gradually emerged beginning in the mid-
twentieth century and has been a mainstay of First Amendment juris-
prudence since the 1980s.47 It is grounded in the idea that the open-
46. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 71–82.
47. Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 224–31 (2013); Robert C. Post, Between Governance
and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV.
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ness of a public forum is inversely proportional to the government’s
ability to regulate individuals’ speech in that venue.48 In other words,
the more open a forum (a public space) is, the more robust individuals’
speech rights are in that venue.
In forum analysis doctrine, the state is traditionally assumed to be
the regulator of the space, and, as we will see, viewpoint neutrality is
a key requirement when government is acting in this role, although,
importantly, neutralism is not.49 Brettschneider defines viewpoint
neutrality as “the legal doctrine that rights should protect the expres-
sion of all opinions” and neutralism as “a political theory that the
state should not promote or express any particular set of values.”50 As
Ross explains, the focus on viewpoint neutrality, and in particular the
protection of “so-called low-worth expression” like “racist, misogynist
and other vile speech,” is largely driven by the assumption that “no
public authority can be trusted to distinguish valuable from worthless
expression.”51 Furthermore, a forum “is not a location-based crite-
rion,” so virtual spaces also constitute various types of fora.52
In a 2012 article, legal scholars Robert Jerry II and Lyrissa Lidsky
summarized the range of judicially-recognized fora in a clear and suc-
cinct manner that is particularly impressive given the complexity of
the jurisprudence.53 Lawyer Derek Langhauser’s step-by-step expla-
nation of how to apply forum analysis doctrine reveals that, as with
many things, the doctrine is clear in theory but messy in fact.54 Draw-
ing on their summary, Figure 1 visualizes the relationship among va-
rious fora as well as government speech. Government speech is
included at the far end of this continuum for purposes of complete-
ness; the following subsection will discuss it in depth.
1713, 1724–45 (1987); Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens & James D. Breslin, A
(Virtual) Land of Confusion with College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing
the Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 49, 61–65 (2013).
48. Neal H. Hutchens & Frank Fernandez, Searching for Balance with Student Free
Speech: Campus Speech Zones, Institutional Authority, and Legislative Preroga-
tives, 5 BELMONT L. REV. 103, 110–14 (2018).
49. Id.
50. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 73.
51. Ross, supra note 8, at 749–50.
52. Sun et al., supra note 47, at 71.
53. Robert H. Jerry II & Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.1: Public Higher Education
Institutions and Social Media, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 55, 67–72 (2012). This
portion of the article relies on Lidsky’s prior work. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public
Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975 (2011).
54. Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum
Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activ-
ity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481 (2005).















Figure 1 - Jerry and Lidsky’s Understanding of the Relationship
Among Areas of Doctrine
Building on this understanding and again drawing from Jerry and
Lidsky’s narrative description, Table 1 layers doctrine onto this con-
tinuum, thus summarizing the doctrinal landscape.
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Table 1 - Summary of Public Forum and Government Speech
Doctrine
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61. Id. at 46.
62. Id.; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (reiterat-
ing rule for restrictions in limited public fora).
63. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
64. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55; U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
65. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49.
66. Id. at 45.
67. Grace, 461 U.S. 171; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263.
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As this summary makes clear, the more open a forum, the less a
government can restrict what happens there—more specifically, the
less it can restrict or punish what individuals say there. The more
closed the forum (with government speech being understood for the
moment as a closed forum one step beyond nonpublic forum), the more
control the government has over individuals’ speech.70 However, even
when the government must maintain viewpoint neutrality, which is,
according to the jurisprudence, anytime except when it is engaging in
government speech, some categories of individual speech remain un-
protected in accordance with First Amendment doctrine, including
speech that constitutes a true threat,71 fighting words,72 speech likely
to cause imminent harm,73 defamation,74 and speech constituting ille-
gal discrimination.75
2. Government as Coercive Speaker
As the discussion up to this point has suggested, forum analysis
and government speech, at first glance, seem to be mutually exclusive
areas of doctrine based on very different ideas about the role of gov-
68. Joseph Blocher, Viewpiont Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV.
695 (2011).
69. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visi-
tors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
70. Although it can be difficult at times to tell whether speech is that of an individual
or an institution, those murky situations are not the focus of this Article. See
Langhauser, supra note 54, at 488.
71. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
72. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
73. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
74. Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1822–23.
75. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2018).
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ernment in different contexts. While I will add contours to this para-
digm later, this subsection first develops a detailed understanding of
the government speech doctrine, a creature of United States common
law in which the government is assumed to be a coercive speaker with
the ability to monopolize the marketplace of ideas and exclude other
viewpoints. The doctrine arises in defense to an individual’s claim that
he or she has been denied an opportunity to speak because his or her
viewpoint contradicts the government’s own.76 This may sound alarm-
ing; however, as noted earlier, the government speaks—and excludes
others from doing so—all the time.
The government speech doctrine emerged from a series of Supreme
Court decisions in which the government, via a public hospital, a pub-
lic park, or publicly-funded art, expresses a viewpoint and denies indi-
viduals an opportunity to do the same. As a constitutional matter,
scholars regularly look to the Court’s 1991 decision in Rust v. Sulli-
van77 as the beginning of the government speech doctrine. In Rust, the
Court held that government could prohibit federally-funded family
planning programs from using federal funds to subsidize abortion, in-
cluding counseling patients regarding abortion and providing referrals
to abortion providers.78 This approach constituted a viewpoint, and
the government was, according to the Court, allowed to mandate that
a prescribed viewpoint be expressed by health care providers in partic-
ipating programs.79
In the decades since Rust, the Court has made clear that the gov-
ernment may freely express viewpoints and that it does not have (or
need) First Amendment protections when doing so. In 2009, the Court
wrote in Pleasant Grove v. Summum:
If [the state was] engaging in [its] own expressive conduct, then the Free
Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts govern-
ment regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A
government entity has the right to “speak for itself.” “[I]t is entitled to say
what it wishes,” and to select the views that it wants to express.80
Most recently in Walker v. Texas, the Court maintained, if not
strengthened, this holding. In Walker, the Court wrote:
When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says. That freedom in part reflects the fact
that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a
check on government speech. Thus, government statements (and government
actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the
First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas. . . . Were
the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, government would not work.
How could a city government create a successful recycling program if officials,
76. Blocher, supra note 68, at 698–99.
77. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 178.
80. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (citations omitted).
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when writing householders asking them to recycle cans and bottles, had to
include in the letter a long plea from the local trash disposal enterprise de-
manding the contrary? . . . “[I]t is not easy to imagine how government could
function if it lacked th[e] freedom” to select the messages it wishes to convey.
 . . . .
That is not to say that a government’s ability to express itself is without re-
striction. . . . But, as a general matter, when the government speaks it is enti-
tled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing
so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.81
In other words, the process of governing—making and enforcing
laws—is one continual process of expressing viewpoints and thwart-
ing individuals’ and groups’ efforts to contradict those viewpoints.
As the Court has explained, “It is inevitable that government will
adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional pow-
ers . . . which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and
sincere convictions of some of its citizens.”82 Indeed, policymaking
means adopting one approach to the exclusion of others—not being
viewpoint neutral. As the Court has stated, “The government, as a
general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or
other exactions binding on protesting parties. . . . [I]t seems inevitable
that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other
expression to advocate and defend its own policies.”83
The check on policymaking, of course, is political. Again, in the
Court’s words: “When the government speaks, for instance to promote
its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, ac-
countable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If
the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position.”84 When described this way, govern-
ment speech appears impossible to separate from our system of gov-
ernment. However, accountability is only possible if the government is
clearly the source of the speech. Walker presented the question of
whether messages on specialty license plates are government
speech.85 To answer this question, the Court employed a somewhat
different test than it had in the past and asked whether a “reasonable
observer” would view the speech as the government’s; ultimately, it
held that the license plates were government speech.86 In many gov-
ernment speech cases, identifying the speaker is complicated, indeed.
81. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207–08
(2015) (citations omitted) (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 468).
82. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 235.
85. Walker, 576 U.S. 200.
86. Id. at 219–20.
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Current scholarship about the government speech doctrine builds
on earlier works by legal scholars Robert Kamenshine,87 Steven Shif-
frin,88 Lawrence Tribe,89 and Mark Yudof,90 which theorized the idea
of government speech. Most significantly over the past decade, legal
scholar Helen Norton’s work has brought particular attention to the
doctrine and done much to explore its potential implications.91 Few
scholars have engaged the doctrine as it pertains specifically to educa-
tional environments, although Joseph Blocher,92 Mark Yudof,93 and
Kristine Bowman94 have done so independently in the context of pri-
mary and secondary schools. The Supreme Court has never directly
engaged the question of whether and how the government speech doc-
trine applies in the context of higher education,95 and the literature
similarly lacks a deep engagement of the government speech doctrine
in the context of higher education.
87. Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979).
88. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
89. Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237
(1978).
90. Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Ex-
pression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 873–97 (1979).
91. See NORTON, supra note 2; Helen Norton, Government Speech and the War on
Terror, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 543 (2017); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the
Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31
(2016); Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73
(2015); Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful
Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 (2012); Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to
Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265 (2011); Helen
Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0., 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
899 (2010); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Ex-
pression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008).
92. Blocher, supra note 68, at 698–99; Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the
First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2007). However, a major open
question in government speech doctrine is how we know if the government is
speaking or if the speech is that of a private individual; in the education context,
scholars have parsed whether student speech or faculty speech is government
speech.
93. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 211 (1983).
94. Bowman, supra note 47.
95. In Rust v. Sullivan, considered to be the foundational government speech case,
the Court stated:
Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere
of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that
the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means
of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is re-
stricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment.
500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603,
605–06 (1967)). This is not exactly deep engagement of core government speech
issues.
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As this brief discussion has made clear, not all government view-
points are expressed in the same way. Government can speak in a co-
ercive, exclusive way, as it does when it enacts policy through laws
and regulations that require or incentivize particular actions by indi-
viduals or organizations. However, government can also seek to per-
suade, leaving decisions about actions up to individuals or
organizations while making its view and rationale clear. Since Rust,
many decisions by the Court have further defined the contours of the
government speech doctrine,96 but the doctrine is still a long way from
having clean edges.97
3. Government as Punitive Agent
The final piece of the doctrinal puzzle is the constraint that the
government cannot take action which creates a “chilling effect” on in-
dividuals’ free speech. This principle emerged in Supreme Court deci-
sions beginning in the 1950s; it took shape particularly during the
1960s.98 For our purposes, it is important to understand that “chilling
effect”—the unconstitutional deterrence of speech otherwise protected
by the First Amendment—is a legal term of art. It is not enough for
speech to be chilled because it is understood in a colloquial sense to be
out of favor when compared with the government viewpoint. Rather,
as legal scholar Frederick Schauer explained in his seminal article on
the topic, an individual must fear that his or her speech will result in
“punishment—be it by fine, imprisonment, imposition of civil liability,
or deprivation of governmental benefit.”99 In other words, for the chil-
ling effect to come into play, a formal sanction must be on the table.100
As such, chilling effect is largely beyond the scope of this Article.
96. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009); Bowman,
supra note 47, at 225–26.
97. See NORTON, supra note 2; Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); Steven G. Gey, Why
Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government
Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1264, 1269 (2010); Norton & Citron,
supra note 91, at 916–17; Richard Schragger, Unconstitutional Government
Speech, in VIRGINIA PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO.
2019–56 (2019); Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 37 (2016).
98. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chil-
ling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685–87 (1978).
99. Id. at 689.
100. The hard questions regarding chilling effect involve queries such as how to make
sense of legal concepts such as defamation, obscenity, and incitement. Schauer’s
article provides great detail regarding these situations. Id. at 687.
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B. How the Doctrines Articulate
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the government has
expressive capacity and exercises it. It also has accepted that the gov-
ernment need not support individuals’ viewpoints when advancing its
own agenda. Furthermore, the Court expects that the government will
be a neutral arbiter of various types of public spaces, and that, as a
general matter, it will not enact laws that chill individuals’ speech.
However, it is not exactly clear how all these ideas fit together. Below,
I depict and discuss ways in which the dominant narrative around
these doctrines operates before offering a subtle yet critical additional
piece.
The conventional understanding of the forum analysis and govern-
ment speech doctrines, discussed and summarized above, is that (1)
forum analysis applies when government is moderating a space; (2)
government speech applies when government is speaking and ex-
cludes an individual with a contrary view from the dialogic space; and
(3) governments do not need special permission to express their view-
points.101 The relationship between the doctrines as understood in
this manner is expressed in Figure 2, with forum analysis and govern-
ment speech as a binary and government viewpoint outside the dy-
namics of the First Amendment.102
101. The Court’s assertions support this summary. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 215 (2015) (“Because the State is
speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend the vari-
ous types of government-established forums do not apply.”); Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000) (“Our decision ought not to be taken to
imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, or—of par-
ticular importance—its faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis
which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name
through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse facul-
ties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. The Court has not held, or
suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come
into play.” (citations omitted)); Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir. 2017)
(“The government speech doctrine does not apply if a government entity has cre-
ated a limited public forum for speech.” (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at
478–80 (2010))). As Papandrea has noted, government speech doctrine and public
forum doctrine “often exist in tension with each other.” Papandrea, supra note 13,
at 1200.
102. Bowman, supra note 47, at 227–29 (describing this trend).









First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause
Figure 2 - Conventional Understanding of Relationship Among
Areas of Doctrine
The understanding depicted in Figure 2 assumes that there are
three things government can do in a speech context: (a) it can moder-
ate; (b) it can speak; and (c) it can exclude others from the dialogic
space. Excluding others can be coercive, such as prohibiting smoking
in public buildings, or persuasive, such as a public health campaign
that discourages smoking and does not publicly subsidize a point of
view that encourages smoking.
If the government is (b) speaking, which it does all the time, then
the default is that it is exercising government viewpoint outside the
purview of the Free Speech Clause; the First Amendment is never
triggered. This is so unless others claim they are (c) wrongly excluded
from the dialogic space by such speech, in which case the government
speech doctrine operates as a defense that protects the government’s
ability to privilege its viewpoint over others.
If the government is (a) moderating, it is acting as the neutral and
also coercive arbiter of a forum, making and enforcing rules. As illus-
trated in Table 1, under forum analysis doctrine if the government is
(a) moderating, it can only (c) exclude others from the dialogic space
for very specific reasons, which change depending on the forum type.
The government cannot simply choose to (c) exclude others from
speaking because their viewpoint contradicts the government’s own
unless the government speech doctrine is the governing principle.
One more permutation is possible, and it is one the jurisprudence
has allowed by noting it is not impossible, rather than explaining why
it is both possible and consistent with the existing doctrine. If the gov-
ernment is (a) moderating, it is acting as the coercive, neutral arbiter
of a forum, and it also presumably (b) can speak persuasively in that
forum. This is conceptually challenging because the presence of gov-
ernment viewpoint in a forum that government moderates contradicts
the implied government neutrality that forum analysis so prizes.
However, it may be that the conceptual relationship between forum
analysis and government speech is not one of mutual exclusion, but
rather one in which overlap exists. This understanding is depicted be-
low in Figure 3.





Figure 3 - Proposed Understanding of Relationship Among Areas of
Doctrine
In this understanding, the part of the Venn diagram that is solely
the public forum doctrine captures the government as a coercive, neu-
tral regulator only. In the space that is solely the government speech
doctrine, the government is a coercive or persuasive speaker that may
exclude all others from speaking. In the space that is in the overlap,
the government is both a coercive, neutral regulator, as moderator of
the forum, and a persuasive, non-neutral speaker alongside other
speakers and their speech rights.103
In sum, the dominant narratives suggest that forum analysis doc-
trine and government speech doctrine are either polar opposites or
points on a continuum: regarding the former doctrine, the government
must regulate individuals’ speech in a viewpoint-neutral way, and
under the protection of the latter doctrine, government may say what
it wants and prohibit any contradictory viewpoint from the same fo-
rum. I contend that the explicit articulation should also acknowledge
how and why government can be a persuasive speaker in a forum it
also coercively regulates. I have also proposed a way to understand
why this is and should be so, rather than merely noting it is permissi-
ble because it is not not so.
IV. UNIVERSITIES AS SPEAKERS
Forum analysis and government speech doctrine both play a prom-
inent role in the speech that occurs on university campuses, including
103. To be clear, this is not what scholars describe as “mixed” speech, where the
speech may belong to both the government and an individual. See Walker, 576
U.S. 200; NORTON, supra note 2, at 5–6; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008).
That is an important type of speech, but it is not what I address here. Rather, I
contend that government’s persuasive speech exists alongside individuals’ speech
in various public fora, and alongside government’s coercive speech.
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the speech of universities themselves. To understand these dynamics,
it is important to understand both how federal constitutional law ap-
plies to speech in public universities and how recent state statutes
have sought to influence these dynamics. When students and others
call on public universities to oppose systemically discriminatory
speech, universities must consider their legal ability to do so. In the
words of noted First Amendment scholar Catherine Ross:
No constitutional hurdle restrains administrators . . . from promoting chosen
messages, including exhortations that encourage empathy, sensitivity, toler-
ance of difference, and civil norms. And nothing keeps them from finding ways
to turn volatile moments that divide communities into teachable moments de-
signed to nourish young people, as many college deans and presidents have
done, even while recognizing the offender’s constitutional right to provoke.104
To be sure, there is no constitutional prohibition that prevents univer-
sities from speaking this way, although, as discussed above, there is a
strong implicit tension between doing so and upholding the value of
neutralism that undergirds free speech jurisprudence and culture.
This presumption of neutralism also runs through recently enacted
state statutes focused on conflicts over free speech on public univer-
sity campuses. These statutes focus on various aspects of free speech
on campus; one group of statutes seeks to dictate specific aspects of
universities’ codes of student conduct, such as requiring universities
to impose discipline in response to particular actions by students.105
Although those particular provisions are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle (they focus on students’ speech, not the speech of the university
itself), two other categories of provisions within this recent legislation
wave are highly relevant to the issues explored in this Article: the des-
ignation of all outdoor public campus spaces as public fora, and the
expectation or aspiration that universities themselves be neutral on
public controversies.
In this Part, I summarize the origins of this recent spate of state
legislative activity before addressing, in turn, public forum analysis in
the university and relevant state statutory provisions, government
speech doctrine in the university, and the presumption of neutralism
in state statutory provisions. Ultimately, I close the loop by analyzing
the ideas of persuasion, coercion, and university speech.
A. The Origins of Recent State Legislation
Between January 1, 2016 and July 1, 2020, more than one-third of
all states enacted legislation about free speech on campus, and in
many other states, similar bills died in committee or on the state
104. Ross, supra note 8, at 764.
105. Franks, supra note 12, at 232–36.
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house floor.106 Prior to this recent uptick in state legislative activity,
only one state (California) had enacted legislation on this topic, and it
did so in 1989. As legal scholar Ben Trachtenberg explains, the recent
trend is part of a broader pattern in which state legislatures increas-
ingly seek to intervene in “day-to-day [campus] operations.”107 Most of
the recent free speech legislation appears to be based on model bills
created by the Goldwater Institute,108 a conservative and libertarian
think tank, and the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education
(FIRE), a libertarian group focused on colleges and universities.109
The Goldwater Institute model bill anchors itself in three reports
about free speech on campus produced at some of the nation’s most
prominent research universities. First, Yale University’s 1974 Report
of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, chaired by noted
historian C. Vann Woodward, emphasized the importance of both free
expression and protest, while also considering how free speech can co-
exist with the educational and administrative functions of the univer-
sity.110 Second, the University of Chicago’s 1967 Report on the
University’s Role in Political and Social Action emphasized the impor-
tance of university neutrality “on the dominant political issues of the
day”111 to facilitate “respect for free inquiry and diversity of view-
points.”112 Third, the University of Chicago’s 2015 Report of the Com-
106. Action has occurred at the federal level as well. Ben Trachtenberg, The People v.
Their Universities: How Popular Discontent Is Reshaping Higher Education Law,
108 KY. L.J. 47, 78–80 (2019). In a 2017 U.S. Senate Committee hearing, Iowa
Senator Charles Grassley suggested that private colleges and institutions that
receive federal funds should be liable for violating free speech rights pursuant to
the Spending Clause. Free Speech 101: The Assault on the First Amendment on
College Campuses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
Sess. (2017) (prepared statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary). In 2019, President Trump issued an executive order regarding
free speech on campus that essentially required public universities to comply
with the Constitution and private universities to comply with their own rules.
Susan Svrluga, Trump Signs Executive Order on Free Speech on College Cam-
puses, WASH. POST (March 21, 2019, 11:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
//2019/03/21/trump-expected-sign-executive-order-free-speech/ [https://perm.unl.
edu/ZR35-7335].
107. Ben Trachtenberg, The 2015 University of Missouri Protests and Their Lessons
for Higher Education Policy and Administration, 107 KY. L.J. 61, 113 (2019).
108. STANLEY KURTZ, JAMES MANLEY & JONATHAN BUTCHER, CAMPUS FREE SPEECH: A
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 19–22 (2017); AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, CAMPUS
FREE-SPEECH LEGISLATION: HISTORY, PROGRESS, AND PROBLEMS 1–2 (2018).
109. Trachtenberg, supra note 106, at 60–62; Frequently Asked Questions: The Cam-
pus Free Expression Act (CAFE), FIRE (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/
frequently-asked-questions-the-campus-free-expression-cafe-act/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/HG9T-D3NG].
110. STEVEN A. BENNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AT YALE (1974); see AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 108, at 4.
111. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 108, at 4.
112. HARRY KALVEN JR. ET AL., REPORT ON THE UNIVERSITY’S ROLE IN POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL ACTION 2 (1967).
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mittee on Freedom of Expression, led by law professor and First
Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone, emphasized “unrestricted debate
and institutional neutrality.”113 The 2015 University of Chicago re-
port has become known as the “Chicago Statement” or “Chicago Prin-
ciples.” According to FIRE, the Chicago Principles were adopted by
over eighty colleges, universities, or university systems as of July
2020.114
Building on this foundation, the Goldwater Institute model bill re-
sponds to what the Institute perceives to be a free speech “crisis” on
American college and university campuses, consisting of speech codes,
trigger warnings, safe spaces, student discipline or lack thereof, physi-
cally small free speech zones, and attempts to de-platform outside
speakers (especially conservative speakers) by disinviting them or
shouting them down.115 The model bill responds to the possibility of
these policies or practices in a variety of ways. Two provisions are rel-
evant to this Article: First, all public areas of college and university
campuses are designated as traditional public fora. Second, “universi-
ties, at the official institutional level, ought to remain neutral on is-
sues of public controversy to encourage the widest possible range of
opinion and dialogue within the university itself.”116 Similarly,
FIRE’s Campus Free Expression model legislation focuses on
designating outdoor public university spaces as traditional public fora
and preventing the disruption (and presumably de-platforming) of
speakers on campus.117
Both of these model statutes are grounded in neutralism, the idea
that the government should remain neutral among all views and thus
presumably remain silent. More specifically, the neutralism of the
aforementioned reports informs the public forum provisions of the
statutes, which focus extensively (though not necessarily exclusively)
on the role of the university as arbiter of a forum acting with both
content and viewpoint neutrality. Additionally, neutralism explicitly
anchors the public controversy provisions, which prohibit universities
from expressing viewpoints lest university views influence the univer-
sity community.
113. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 108, at 5; GEOFFREY STONE ET AL.,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2015).
114. Chicago Statement: University and Faculty Body Support, FIRE (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://www.thefire.org/chicago-statement-university-and-faculty-body-support/
[https://perma.unl.edu/MN9B-NXJN].
115. Various scholars dispute the existence of a “crisis.” See Franks, supra note 12, at
221–32; Trachtenberg, supra note 106, at 54–60.
116. KURTZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 2.
117. Campus Free Expression Act Multistate DRAFT, FIRE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://
d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/18105224/Ca-Expres-
sion-Act.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/BRM7-Z8YN].
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B. Forum Analysis and Public Universities’ Speech
Legal scholars Vikram Amar and Alan Brownstein as well as
higher education scholars Neal Hutchens and Frank Fernandez cau-
tion us to remember that “[m]ultiple fora can exist on public college
and university campuses. . . . Additionally, depending on its usage at a
particular time, a campus space can take the form of more than one
type of forum.”118 Forum analysis doctrine continues to be a complex
and important piece of the legal regulation of free speech on cam-
pus.119 This section discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence re-
garding forum analysis in universities and the fifteen state statutory
provisions, based on the Goldwater Institute and FIRE model legisla-
tion, that create public fora out of outdoor university spaces.
1. Forum Analysis in Public Universities
Forum analysis doctrine has determined the outcome of many im-
portant free speech cases involving universities. As Amar and Brown-
stein have noted, “[t]he uses to which property is put on a university
campus are extraordinarily diverse,” and this variation results in mul-
tiple types of fora on university campuses.120 Despite this diversity,
all of the most prominent university forum analysis cases have in-
volved the same type of forum—limited public forum. I summarize
these three cases here to illustrate how forum analysis works in a uni-
versity setting and to further explain the jurisprudence: Rosenberger
v. Rectors of the University of Virginia (1995), Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin v. Southworth (2000), and Christian Legal So-
ciety v. Martinez (2010).
First, in Rosenberger, the University of Virginia, in accordance
with university policy, denied student activity fund support to a stu-
dent organization that sought to pay an outside contractor to print a
religious (Christian) newspaper.121 The Court first identified that the
student activity fund was a limited public forum, though it did not
engage in a deep analysis to support that classification. It did, how-
ever, take care to analyze whether the speaker was the student organ-
ization, the university, or both. It determined:
The distinction between the University’s own favored message and the private
speech of students is evident in the case before us. The University itself has
taken steps to ensure the distinction in the agreement each [contractor] must
sign. The University declares that the student groups eligible for SAF support
118. Hutchens & Fernandez, supra note 48, at 114; see Vikram David Amar & Alan E.
Brownstein, A Close-up, Modern Look at First Amendment Academic Freedom
Rights of Public College Students and Faculty, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2017).
119. Hutchens & Fernandez, supra note 48, at 114–21.
120. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 118, at 1964.
121. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 822–23, 825, 827 (1995).
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are not the University’s agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its
responsibility.122
Having identified the forum (the student activity fund), the
speaker (the student organization), and the role of the university (neu-
tral arbiter of the forum, in other words coercive regulator), the Court
summarized its rules about government activity in a limited public
forum: The government “may legally preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is dedicated,”123 including content dis-
crimination if content distinctions “reserv[e the forum] for certain
groups or for the discussion of certain topics”124; however, others’
speech may only be excluded if such action is “reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum”125 and the speech is not excluded
“on the basis of its viewpoint.”126 The Court held that in this circum-
stance, “the University [did] not exclude religion as a subject matter
[in the forum], but select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”127 The Court
thus struck down the university’s distinction and allowed the student
organization to access university funds to print the religious
newspaper.
Five years later, in 2000, the Court decided Southworth, another
student activity fund case. The question in this case was whether stu-
dents could be required to pay a student activity fee that supported
student organizations, and in so doing, be compelled to support view-
points contrary to their own.128 The Court engaged in dicta regarding
the government speech doctrine and was clear that the speech of stu-
dent organizations was not government speech. It underscored the as-
sumption that government speech questions are distinct from forum
analysis questions.129 Then, the Court applied other forum analysis
cases, noting they were instructive “by close analogy,”130 and over-
turned the district court and Seventh Circuit’s opinions, holding that
the university could require students to pay an activity fee that would
be used to support all student organizations.131 Echoing Rosenberger,
it was important in Southworth that the university’s system for fund-
ing student organizations was viewpoint-neutral.132
122. Id. at 834–35 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 829 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 390 (1993)).
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
804–06 (1985)).
126. Id. at 830 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393).
127. Id. at 831.
128. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
129. Id. at 229–30.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 229–36.
132. Id.
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Most recently, in 2010, the Court decided Christian Legal Society
v. Martinez (CLS),133 another case involving a student organization
which turned on the forum analysis doctrine. In CLS, a public univer-
sity’s law school adopted a non-discrimination policy applicable to all
registered student organizations which effectively required that regis-
tered student organizations accept any student who wanted to be a
member, without restriction.134 However, the local chapter of CLS,
consistent with the national organization, required that its members
sign a “statement of faith” which, among other things, prohibited ex-
tramarital sexual conduct or “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”135
CLS contended the non-discrimination policy violated its rights of free
speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion.136 The
Court analyzed the forum of registered student organizations as a lim-
ited public forum in which the law school’s viewpoint-neutral “all-com-
ers” policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum.137 It
held that CLS did not have to pursue status as a recognized student
organization, but if it wanted that status and the funding that came
with that designation, it needed to jettison its “statement of faith” re-
quirement for members.
These three cases provide a window into the Court’s application of
limited public forum doctrine to public universities. In these cases, the
university is assumed to be a neutral regulator as well as a coercive
regulator. Furthermore, the importance of the university acting in a
viewpoint neutral manner is a dominant theme that ties these cases
together. Although the university may not be explicitly excluded from
persuasively participating in the forum, it is implicitly assumed to not
be present as a speaker.
2. Everything Outdoors Is a Public Forum
Between January 1, 2016 and July 1, 2020, fifteen states enacted
statutes about public universities and public fora based on Goldwater
Institute or FIRE’s model legislation. The public forum statutes typi-
cally seek to establish “the public areas of the university’s campuses”
as “public forums, open on the same terms to any speaker.”138 The
statutes thus aim to enhance the opportunities for individuals’ speech
on college campuses. These provisions are framed as responding to
universities restricting student speech by physically limiting student
speech to what FIRE characterizes as “unconstitutionally restrictive
133. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).




138. KURTZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 13.
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‘free speech zones,’”139 which are typically smaller areas of a campus
that universities have designated as traditional public fora in contrast
to the remainder of campus, where speech presumably can be some-
what more regulated.
States have attempted to quash these free speech zones, in favor of
much larger areas for free speech on campus, in a variety of ways.
Alabama’s statute addresses this explicitly, specifying: “[T]he institu-
tion shall not create free speech zones or other designated outdoor ar-
eas of campus in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive
activities.”140 Most state statutes seeking to accomplish this goal,
however, take a more subtle approach. Although most create tradi-
tional public fora, some create limited or designated fora.141 Specifi-
cally, ten states invoke the legal term of art “traditional public forum”
when describing outdoor campus areas (Arizona,142 Arkansas,143 Col-
orado,144 Florida,145 Kentucky,146 Louisiana,147 Missouri,148 Tennes-
see,149 Texas,150 and Utah151). Three states effectively designate all
outdoor campus spaces as traditional public fora by using aspects of
legal definitions and restrictions, although they do not use the specific
term of art (Iowa,152 Oklahoma,153 and Virginia154). Two states re-
quire that outdoor campus spaces be designated or limited public fora
(Alabama155 and South Dakota156).
Of these fifteen states, one enacted its statute in 2015; two enacted
statutes between 2016 and 2018; and eight enacted statutes in 2019.
Geographically, most of these states are southern, though a couple are
southwestern, border, or midwestern. Politically, ten of these states
have cast their electoral college votes consistently for Republican pres-
139. Frequently Asked Questions: The Campus Free Expression (CAFE Act), FIRE
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/frequently-asked-questions-the-campus-
free-expression-cafe-act/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9JYW-GAUF].
140. H.B. 498, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
141. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1864(D) (2019) (“The public areas of univer-
sity and community college campuses are public forums and are open on the same
terms to any speaker.”).
142. H.B. 2548, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016).
143. S.B. 156, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-5-144 (2018).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1004.097 (West Supp. 2020).
146. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.348 (West Supp. 2019).
147. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3399.35(6) (2020).
148. MO. ANN. STAT. § 173.1550.2 (West Supp. 2020).
149. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-7-2045(11) (West Supp. 2020).
150. TEX. EDUC. CODE. ANN. § 51.9315(c)(1) (West Supp. 2020).
151. UTAH CODE § 53B-27-203(1) (2017).
152. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 261H.2, 261H.4 (West Supp. 2020).
153. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 2120 (2019).
154. VA. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-401 (2016).
155. H.B. 498, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
156. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-53-51 (2020).
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idential candidates since 2000; the other five have supported Republi-
can and Democratic candidates at various times since 2000.157 None
of the states have consistently supported Democratic presidential can-
didates since 2000.
These statutes seem to achieve their goal of eliminating free
speech zones and opening more physical space for student speech on
campus. Yet, students are not the only speakers at a university, and it
is important to consider the impact that designating the entire cam-
pus to be a traditional public forum would have on persuasive govern-
ment speech. This impact, of course, will vary depending on how one
understands the public forum and government speech doctrines indi-
vidually and as connected to one another. As described above, the gov-
ernment is most often assumed to moderate a forum, and it is
important that it fill this role in a neutral way. The caselaw and model
statutes are consistent in emphasizing this. Yet, as the Court also
noted in Rosenberger in 1995: “A holding that the University may not
discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech
it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is
controlled by different principles.”158 Although the University’s
speech may not be excluded from this forum, it is also not excepted.
C. Government Speech Doctrine and University Speech
Since public universities are state actors, the government speech
doctrine applies to them whether their speech is coercive or persua-
sive. Yet, the fit is an odd one, and incompatible with a handful of new
state statutory provisions that require governments to maintain neu-
trality about public controversies. This section explores both issues in
turn.
1. Government Speech Doctrine in Universities
The consequences of university speech being “government speech”
are clear. The government speech doctrine gives the government both
great leeway over its own speech and the ability to exclude other
speakers from the forum in which it is speaking. More specifically, the
university may engage in both content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court was clear to note the
university’s vast authority regarding its own speech.159 Over a decade
later in 1995, the Court summarized Widmar as:
157. Electoral Map: Red or Blue States Since 2000, 270 TO WIN, https://
www.270towin.com/content/blue-and-red-states [https://perma.unl.edu/47WQ-
QB9K] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
158. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (citing Bd. of Ed v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 270–72 (1988)).
159. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1981).
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[A] proper recognition of the principle that when the State is the speaker, it
may make content-based choices. When the University determines the con-
tent of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not ex-
pressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message.160
Some public university speech falls squarely into the category of
government speech. As Jerry and Lidsky note, “This doctrine most ob-
viously applies when, for example, [university] administrators issue
directives to carry out university operations; announce management
decisions or information; or address students or faculty in meetings,
retreats, convocations, or academic ceremonies.”161 They further spec-
ulate that “[c]ourts are likely to treat university social media sites
that do not permit user comments as government speech.”162 These
examples, of course, contain both coercive and persuasive speech, and
a large part of what brings the government speech doctrine into play
is that the university is not sharing the forum.
Just as sharing the forum can remove the protections of the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, so too can ambiguity about the identity of
the speaker. In other words, if it is not clear that the government itself
is speaking, then the government speech doctrine does not come into
play. For example, in Widmar, the Court relied on identifying the
speaker as the student organization, as opposed to the university, to
overturn a university’s ban on student organizations using public uni-
versity facilities for worship and religious instruction.163 The Court
held that student organizations’ use of university space did not trans-
form individual or group speech into government speech.
Clarity about the source of the speech is part of what enables the
check on government speech—public accountability through the politi-
cal process—to work. The idea is that if the public disagrees with the
government speech and no longer wants the government to convey
that message, it can take action at the ballot box. The public must
know the government is speaking in order for this to work. In the con-
text with which this Article is concerned, the university is clearly the
speaker. The university develops, endorses, and expresses a mes-
sage.164 Indeed, a university’s speech has power to block or challenge
systemically discriminatory speech of others in large part because the
speech can unequivocally be identified as the speech of the university.
The traditional model of accountability for government speech may
160. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
161. Jerry & Lidsky, supra note 53, at 74.
162. Id.
163. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273, 280–81 (noting that such a prohibition was not required
by the Establishment Clause).
164. See Papandrea, supra note 13, at 1201.
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not work all that well in the university context, but this is not because
of a lack of transparency about the speaker’s identity.165
The accountability challenge arises because the political process
check does not apply as readily to most public universities as it does to
state legislatures or other bodies. As recent Black Lives Matter soli-
darity messages demonstrated, the university president is the voice of
the university in a practical sense, not the university board of trust-
ees. The board of trustees select the university president and is the
only entity that can fire a university president.166 If the university
community does not like the university’s message delivered by the
president, even a vote of no confidence from a university’s faculty can-
not remove a president—it can merely signal a significant lack of sup-
port to the board of trustees.167 Furthermore, although some public
universities’ trustees are elected, many with much longer terms than
other elected officials, most are appointed by state governors.168 Be-
cause the structure of the university is a hybrid corporate-government
structure, the government speech doctrine is a somewhat unusual fit
for the university context even though a public university and its em-
ployees, when acting in their official capacity, are undisputedly state
actors in a legal sense.169
2. Expecting Government Neutrality
From January 1, 2016 to July 1, 2020, four states enacted statutes
that limit the persuasive speech in which public universities can en-
gage, even under the government speech doctrine. These statutes,
which have direct consequences for university speech, were the jump-
ing off point for this Article.
The four states’ approaches can be divided into three categories.
The first approach, adopted in two states, is aspirational and not ac-
companied by an enforcement mechanism: Alabama’s statute says,
“the institution should strive to remain neutral”;170 Arizona’s says,
“the institution is encouraged to attempt to remain neutral, as an in-
165. Id.
166. See generally Andrés Bernasconi, Tenure of University Presidents, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (June 23, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/world-view/tenure-
university-presidents [https://perma.unl.edu/T2ZX-RF5E].
167. See, e.g., Kevin Kiley, Voting with No Confidence, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 23,
2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/23/votes-no-confidence-pro-
liferate-their-impact-seems-minimal [https://perma.unl.edu/G5KH-DAS6].
168. See generally Gubenetorial Appointment “Cleanest Way” to Ensure Accountability
in University Trustees, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.michiganradio./
post/gubernatorial-appointment-cleanest-way-ensure-accountability-university-
https://perma.unl.edu/3ZB7-EMJH].
169. State Action Requirement, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
state_action_requirement [https://perma.unl.edu/S7DU-475Z] (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
170. H.B. 498, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2019).
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stitution.”171 The second approach is slightly stronger, stating an ex-
pectation of institutional neutrality and also calling for an annual
public report discussing instances in which public universities are liv-
ing up to this standard and in which they fall short. This creates pub-
lic accountability, if not enforcement. Georgia’s statute asks its Board
of Regents to publish a report each year addressing “[a]ctions taken by
state institutions of higher learning, including difficulties, controver-
sies, or successes, in maintaining a posture of administrative and in-
stitutional neutrality with regard to political or social issues.”172 The
third approach is the strongest. North Carolina’s statute mandates an
annual public report and also requires the public university system to
“develop and adopt a policy on free expression” that, in part, prohibits
institutions from “tak[ing] action, as an institution, on the public pol-
icy controversies of the day in such a way as to require students,
faculty, or administrators to publicly express a given view of social
policy.”173
The Goldwater Institute characterizes these neutrality provisions
as “aspirational” and explains them as fostering diversity of viewpoint
on campus: “When a university, as an institution, takes a strong stand
on a major public debate, this inherently pressures faculty and stu-
dents to toe the official university line, thereby inhibiting their free-
dom to speak and decide for themselves.”174 The Institute does not use
the terms “coercion” or “chilling effect” but does adopt the colloquial
understandings of those terms as discussed earlier.175 Relatedly,
these state statutory provisions also enact the Goldwater Institute’s
commitment to neutralism, the idea that government should be neu-
tral among competing views. As an additional reason to support neu-
tralism, the Goldwater Institute cautions that “when the university
speaks, it does so with funds that have likely not been given to it for
that purpose.”176 This makes assumptions about both the mission of
the university and the role of the university as speaker. If the univer-
171. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1864(G) (2019).
172. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-48.1(3) (West 2019).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-300 (2019).
174. KURTZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 5.
175. Chilling effect doctrine is not part of questions regarding universities’ persuasive
expression of their own viewpoint in opposition to systemic discrimination. A uni-
versity’s speech in these circumstances may “chill” an individual’s systemically
discriminatory speech in a colloquial sense. That is, it may deter such speech
because the speaker does not want to be out of favor with the university. This is
unproblematic in a legal sense: When a university is declaring its own views and,
in particular, when it is engaging in counter-speech to systemically discrimina-
tory speech impacting the university community, it is speaking persuasively and
seeking to convince rather than to compel. Accordingly, coercion and chilling ef-
fect are of limited relevance to this situation. See, e.g., McGlone v. Cheek, 534 F.
App’x 293, 298–99 (6th Cir. 2013).
176. KURTZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 9.
930 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:896
sity’s mission is to create and disseminate knowledge—and scholars
from various disciplines and across the political spectrum agree that it
is177—then the question is whether the university is also committed
to ensuring equal opportunity for marginalized and minoritized mem-
bers of its community.178 If so, the university may need to use its
voice, specifically its persuasive speech, to help level the playing field.
Under Garcetti v. Ceballos,179 it is unclear whether state legisla-
tures can prevent universities from speaking in this way. Although
Garcetti is focused on the official job duty speech of individual employ-
ees, it is, at its core, about the state controlling its own speech. Thus
Garcetti is consistent with the broad contours of the government
speech doctrine. Essentially, Garcetti holds that the government owns
the speech of its employees and can control it.180 This Article focuses
on the speech of universities, but, in a very real sense, institutional
speech is only possible through individuals. Consequently, if a state
statute prohibits a university from taking a stand on controversial
matters of the day, thereby curtailing what a state employee (i.e., a
university president) can say and the policies he or she can enact,
Garcetti would seem to support such a restriction. This is the case
even though Garcetti assumes an exception for academic freedom,181
since academic freedom is focused on deference to individual faculty
members’ professional judgment in first-person activities of teaching
and research—not on the speech of the university itself.182
However, there is one significant caveat to the potentially broad
authority Garcetti may give state legislatures in this regard. Some
state constitutions or judicial decisions ensure public universities con-
stitutional autonomy.183 In other words, public universities are not
agencies of the executive or legislative branch, but rather are indepen-
dent entities.184 If a public university has autonomy to manage its
177. See generally ULRICH BAER, WHAT SNOWFLAKES GET RIGHT: FREE SPEECH, TRUTH,
AND EQUALITY ON CAMPUS (2019); SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
(2017); CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 9; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, SPEAK
FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH (2019).
178. See generally BAER, supra note 177; BEN-PORATH, supra note 177.
179. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
180. Id. at 410–11.
181. Id. at 425.
182. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE (1940), available  at https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-
statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure [https://perma.unl.edu/
XHR2-ZWJA]; see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 118 (giving an excellent
overview of academic freedom rights).
183. See, e.g., DEBORAH K. MCKNIGHT, MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEPT., UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2004); Neal H.
Hutchens, Preserving the Independence of Public Higher Education: An Examina-
tion of State Constitutional Autonomy Provisions for Public Colleges and Univer-
sities, 35 J.C. & U.L. 271 (2009).
184. See Hutchens, supra note 183, at 282.
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own affairs, then this also arguably includes deciding the messages it
will convey to members of its community as well as the policies it will
enact. If a university has constitutional autonomy, it is not obvious
why another branch of government would be able to restrict its
speech, and policies which gain traction through speech, to and on be-
half of its own community.
Regardless of whether a public university has constitutional auton-
omy, consider what it would be like to apply the Goldwater Institute’s
neutrality provision to the issue of international students and immi-
gration—certainly a “public policy controversy of the day.”185 First,
what would it mean for an institution to be neutral regarding visa
restrictions and undocumented students; would it mean that the uni-
versity was obligated to be silent? However, especially in a case like
this, does silence indicate agreement with the federal regulations and
related actions, in which case silence is not neutral? What would it
look like to not be silent? Could a university speak publicly about the
benefit these students bring to the institution and the nation, and en-
act a policy that supports them by providing access to information and
resources?186 Could it sue the federal government on their behalf?187
The actions—and speech—of university employees are necessary to
implement these policies and do things such as make funds available,
provide access to food and housing, and perhaps even provide legal
advice. They also are not neutral. Even if a public university were to
enact such policies or express such views, it also could, and presuma-
bly would, continue to allow individuals and groups on campus to ex-
press all views about these issues—moderating the forum in a
185. See Karin Fischer, As MIT and Harvard Sue, Colleges Scramble to Respond to
New Federal Policy on International Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 8,
2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/as-mit-and-harvard-sue-colleges-scram-
ble-to-respond-to-new-federal-policy-on-international-students [https://
perma.unl.edu/XPH7-KLB8]; Karin Fischer, An “America First” Presidency
Clashes with Higher Ed’s Worldview, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 1, 2017), https:/
/www.chronicle.com/article/an-america-first-presidency-clashes-with-higher-eds-
worldview/ [https://perma.unl.edu/42PQ-RLEB]; Katherine Mangan, Supreme
Court Ruling Relieves DACA Students and Energizes Activism, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (June 18, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/supreme-court-ruling-
relieves-daca-students-and-energizes-activism [https://perma.unl.edu/R7A8-
KEH7]; Fernanda Zamudio-Suaréz, Higher-Ed Groups Warn Against Visa Re-
strictions for Chinese Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 30, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/higher-ed-groups-warn-against-visa-restrictions-for-
chinese-students/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Q6S4-Z2F2].
186. See, e.g., Undocumented Student Resources, MICH. STATE UNIV., https://undocu-
mented.msu.edu [https://perma.unl.edu/YW8N-983U] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
187. Karin Fischer, As MIT and Harvard Sue, Colleges Scramble to Respond to New
Federal Policy on International Students, supra note 185.
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technically coercive and neutral manner and participating alongside
the other speakers in a persuasive manner.188
D. Persuasion, Coercion, and University Speech
Public universities have broad leeway under the government
speech doctrine to advance their views while excluding others’ view-
points, but this Article is not intended to justify or encourage the use
of that option. Rather, I contend that by understanding a public uni-
versity’s speech as coercive or persuasive, we can recognize that a pub-
lic university can be a persuasive speaker in a public forum alongside
the speech it regulates in a viewpoint-neutral way. This is different
from the dominant understandings of the forum analysis and govern-
ment speech doctrines, in which the government is either the silent
moderator of the forum or the coercive rule-maker who can exclude
others’ viewpoints. When pushed to consider the role of government as
a speaker in a public forum, the common response is that such speech
is not prohibited. Those doctrines apply in the same way to public uni-
versities as they do to cities, states, and the federal government. Thus,
the lack of nuance about government speech constrains analyses
about public universities’ speech as well.
Like general-purpose governments, universities engage in coercive
speech in the form of rule-making: student codes of conduct189 and
rules regulating employee behavior and terms of employment are the
university-equivalent of local law; administrative policies are the
counterpart to administrative agency regulations. Like elected gov-
ernmental bodies, universities make policy to govern their commu-
nity. All of these rules and regulations constitute coercive speech and
thus fit neatly into the legal category of “government speech.”
Additionally, public universities engage in substantial persuasive
speech. When university presidents speak at convocation and gradua-
tion, and when they communicate regularly with their campuses, they
188. This example demonstrates Hutchens and Fernandez’s characterization of these
statutes as essentially proposing “to muzzle institutional leaders on various
speech issues to weaken the notion that institutions are able to espouse values
related to, for instance, diversity and inclusion.” Hutchens & Fernandez, supra
note 48, at 126. They criticize this as both “misunderstanding the place of colleges
as appropriately being able to advocate for certain positions” and presumably
“prov[ing] exceptionally difficult to implement” because it hinges on the meaning
of vague terms such as “controversial.” Id. at 126–27. Ultimately, they express
concern that the “neutrality provision [is] best viewed as using free speech as
intellectual cover to undermine institutional autonomy.” Id. at 127.
189. See generally WILLIAM FISCHER ET AL., TNG CONSULTING, A DEVELOPMENTAL
FRAMEWORK FOR A CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT: TNG MODEL CODE PROJECT
(2013) (providing model codes of student conduct for public and private universi-
ties as well as community colleges, and noting that the consulting group has writ-
ten codes of student conduct for over seventy-five institutions).
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often are opining and seeking to persuade rather than demanding
compliance. This is persuasive speech, and yet it is also government
speech if the university is not sharing the microphone (the actual
microphone in the case of a graduation or the metaphorical one in the
case of a regular email message). However, when seeking to persuade,
speakers often want to invite others into the conversation. Therefore,
persuasive speech may better achieve its purpose in a forum where
interaction takes place not just because the university permits it but
because other speakers have a right to share their views there as well.
Under a traditional understanding of forum analysis doctrine, though,
the government moderates and is not assumed to participate in these
fora, so a public university’s persuasive speech is not part of the ex-
plicit legal framework of forum analysis. Perhaps because public uni-
versities engage in a great deal of persuasive speech, arguably even
more than general purpose governments, the need for a fitting legal
and conceptual framework—and examples of its application—seems
critical.
Counter-speech by University of Florida President Kent Fuchs to
white nationalist Richard Spencer provides a helpful illustration of
persuasive government speech by a university across various fora.
When Spencer came to the University of Florida in the fall of 2018,
Fuchs was outspoken in his opposition to Spencer’s message. Fuchs
conveyed this through messages sent to the university community in
email, video, the campus newspaper, via social media, and in public
spaces.190 In all circumstances, Fuchs spoke persuasively, seeking to
convince those in the university community and beyond that Spencer’s
views were wrong. Fuchs did not speak coercively, punishing Spencer
or threatening to punish those who supported him. Fuchs was clear
that he was speaking in his official capacity, so there was no confusion
that he was speaking as the university.
The legal rules applicable to Fuchs’s speech vary, however. Con-
sider some specific examples. First, when Fuchs’s official statements
were published on the university’s website,191 they were protected by
the government speech doctrine. This is because the university has
190. See also Ross, supra note 8, at 765 (noting that when Richard Spencer visited
Texas A&M, university leaders engaged in counter-speech as well).
191. W. Kent Fuchs, Potential Speaker on Campus, UNIV. FLA.: STATEMENTS (Aug. 12,
2017), http://statements.ufl.edu/statements/2017/08/potential-speaker-on-
camp.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2M95-72JU]; W. Kent Fuchs, UF Denies Re-
quest for Speaking Event – Message from President Fuchs, UNIV. FLA.: STATE-
MENTS (Aug. 16, 2017), http://statements.ufl.edu/statements/2017/08/uf-denies-
request-for-speaking-event---message-from-president-fuchs.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/-6HBF]; W. Kent Fuchs, Update on Potential Speaker from Presi-
dent Fuchs, UNIV. FLA.: STATEMENTS (Aug. 30, 2017), http://statements.ufl.edu/
statements//08/update-on-potential-speaker-from-president-fuchs.html [https://
perma.edu/WM87-KJLD]; W. Kent Fuchs, Statement from President Fuchs About
Richard Spencer Appearance, UNIV. FLA.: STATEMENTS (Oct. 10, 2017), http://
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used those spaces in a way that makes clear they are only available
for its own speech, not the speech of anyone who may want to use
them. Thus, even though these statements were persuasive speech
(they did not create or enforce rules or regulations, so they were not
coercive), they constituted the official and exclusive view expressed in
that nonpublic forum.
Second, Fuchs wrote about Spencer’s views and campus visit in his
regular column in the school newspaper.192 A public university news-
paper easily can have multiple types of fora within it. For example,
the letter-to-the-editor section could not restrict based on viewpoint,
but may limit itself to letters written by students, faculty, or staff of
the university; any such restrictions would need to be reasonable in
light of the purpose of the forum as well as viewpoint-neutral. As a
result, limited public forum is a good fit for the letter-to-the-editor sec-
tion. However, the rest of the newspaper is closer to a nonpublic forum
controlled by the journalists and newspaper itself. That the newspa-
per allowed Fuchs regular access (via his column) does not open the
forum beyond nonpublic, so long as access is granted on a case-by-case
basis. For no other reason than length and cost of the publication, a
newspaper would need to determine who can make regular contribu-
tions and the length of those contributions.
Third, Fuchs made comments about Spencer’s views in the out-
door, public areas of campus; we know this because a student journal-
ist appears to have unexpectedly encountered Fuchs on campus,
interviewed him, and shared the recorded interview online.193 Unless
the campus had designated free speech zones, these outdoor, public
areas would be traditional public fora moderated by the university, or
perhaps designated public fora also moderated by the university but
open only to members of the university community and not to the gen-
eral public. To view this space as a public forum that the university
was required to facilitate but could not participate in would have de-
nied Fuchs—the embodiment of the university—a voice in that arena,
where he sought to engage in counter-speech. On the other hand, to
view the controlling doctrine as government speech, since Fuchs was
expressing a viewpoint on behalf of the university, would have allowed
the university to shut down all speech that was contrary to Fuchs’s in
that forum, which seems normatively ill-advised and also not the pur-
statements.ufl.edu/statements/2017/10/statement-from-president-fuchs-ab-spen-
cer-appearance.html [https://perma.unl.edu/YX3M-9HWV].




193. First Coast News, UF President Dr. Kent Fuchs Speaks About Richard Spencer
Event, YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJCdpab
NQrM [https://perma.unl.edu/5A95-FFRK].
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pose of the government speech doctrine.194 The reality of the situation
was that the university, through Fuchs, was both arbiter and partici-
pant. Most recently, during May and June 2020, similar speech from
university leaders was everywhere as the Black Lives Matter move-
ment gained momentum.
All of these events demonstrate the necessity of theorizing the way
in which a university is speaking in a forum as well as the interaction
of that speech with constitutional doctrine, rather than merely noting
that such speech is not per se prohibited. Especially if free speech is to
flourish on campuses where minoritized voices have been excluded, a
powerful speaker or speakers, such as the university itself, must be
able to answer systemically discriminatory speech with persuasive
counter-speech, and this should be an explicit part of the way that we
understand the doctrine.195 The university is not the only speaker
who can speak on behalf of the minoritized or marginalized, but it is
among the best able to do so. To be clear, the university can speak
persuasively in this way, seeking to convince196—it is not limited to
speaking coercively by making rules and enforcing them through
discipline.
V. CONCLUSION
If we expect university leaders to speak about institutional values
and engage in speech opposing systemically discriminatory speech
and actions, it is necessary to understand how the law shapes their
ability to do so. This is especially important in the present moment
because free speech controversies and political protests have gripped
campuses and communities across the country in the past few years
with an intensity we have not seen since the 1960s.197 Indeed, the
recent Black Lives Matter protests may be the largest in American
history.198 Only time will tell whether this is merely a period of social
unrest, or one of punctuated equilibrium.
194. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 832–33 (1995) (noting “when the state is the
speaker, it may make content-based choices” and may engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination); Papandrea, supra note 13, at 1198 (“[T]he government must speak
to be effective and that it need not embrace opposing viewpoints whenever it
does.”).
195. Gelber & Bowman, supra note 3.
196. Id.




198. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://wwwny-
times.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/382L-EPPT].
936 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:896
Either way, university leaders are being asked to speak in support
of minoritized groups and, seemingly more than ever before, are
choosing to do so. This raises many questions. To analyze these ques-
tions in a scholarly manner and help move the conversation forward,
this Article looks to Brettschneider’s theory of value democracy, which
posits that government should use its speech to support fundamental
values of freedom and equality. Additionally, this Article draws a dis-
tinction between different roles government can hold when it speaks—
advocate/persuader or regulator/coercer. Turning to federal constitu-
tional doctrine, even though we often talk about the government as
either neutral moderator of a forum in which others speak or as a
speaker in its own right who can monopolize the forum, scholars and
courts also acknowledge in passing that this is not the complete pic-
ture. Understanding government speech in a more nuanced way—spe-
cifically, as coercive or persuasive—provides a way to affirmatively
explain why the government can speak persuasively alongside other
speakers in forums it moderates (as opposed to noting simply that it is
not prohibited from doing so). This interpretation theorizes govern-
ment speech in a more robust manner and in one that also reflects our
lived realities.
This is important and timely not only because of some university
leaders’ desire to speak in a way that supports minoritized members of
their community but also because emerging trends in state law are
complicating the landscape. In the past few years, numerous states
have declared all or most outdoor areas of public university campuses
to be traditional public fora. The nuanced understanding I develop in
this Article explains how and why the university can, consistent with
existing doctrine, engage in these spaces as a persuasive speaker
alongside others. Second, state legislatures in four other states have
constrained universities’ ability to speak on matters of public contro-
versy. While neutral on their face, these sorts of provisions will oper-
ate to the disadvantage of minoritized students, faculty, and staff. The
reach of these provisions likely varies from state to state, in some con-
texts arguably silencing universities. Yet, universities are not merely
places where speech happens; they are powerful speakers in their own
right and have been for a long time, even if this has been hidden from
our view.
